5 pirates of different ages have a treasure of 100 gold coins. On their ship, they decide to split the coins using this scheme: The oldest pirate proposes how to share the coins, and all other remaining pirates will vote for or against it (the proposer will not vote). If 50% or more of the voters vote for it, then the coins will be shared that way. Otherwise, the pirate proposing the scheme will be thrown overboard, and the process is repeated with the pirates that remain. Assume that all 5 pirates are intelligent, rational, greedy, and do not wish to die, (and are rather good at math for pirates). Also a pirate will vote against a proposal if by doing so he has nothing to lose. What will happen?
What happens when the proposer can also vote and a pirate votes for a proposal if by doing so he has nothing to lose?
1 comment:
97, 0, 1, 0, 2.
100, 0, 0, 0, 0.
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